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Abstract 
War and widespread poverty plague the developing countries of the world in a devastatingly violent 
cycle. This paper illustrates a correlation between economics and the role it can play in violence. The 
author surveys three theoretical approaches to understanding conflict resolution and socioeconomic 
causal relationships of violence, summarizes empirical evidence of those causal relationships, ex-
plores these relationships in terrorism and civil war, and utilizes those theories and empirical data in 
an analytical case study of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, including a correlation coefficient ma-
trix and regression analysis with policy implications. The theoretical approaches surveyed include hu-
man security and development, the horizontal inequalities theory, and structural demographic theory. 
The unique and peaceful approach of growing a developing nation’s economy could be key to break-
ing the cycle of violent conflict in war-torn countries and avoiding such violence in countries on the 
verge of civil war. 
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Possibly the most unfortunate state of affairs of all is war. Armed conflicts around the 
world yield countless refugees, widows, orphans, and render many destitute. The costs of armed 
conflict in many ways are immeasurable, but action can and should be taken to prevent situations 
causing the outbreak of violence in addition to rebuilding and rendering aid in post-conflict occa-
sions. Although socioeconomic issues are not the primary reason for conflict, empirical evidence 
supports that there is a strong case for causal relationships between economic stability and vio-
lence. A survey of three theoretical concepts, in addition to empirical evidence, examples of civil 
war and terrorism, policy choices, and an analysis of a case study of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan, may further develop understanding of the subject. Finally, the potential roles of non-
government (both not-for-profit and for-profit entities) and government organizations in pre-
venting conflict through economic development will be addressed. 
Three theoretical approaches to understanding links between conflict and socioeconomic 
standing are human security and development, horizontal inequalities and conflict, and structural 
demographic theory.  Human security and development, as indicated by Krause and Jutersonke 
(2005), is based on the basic human need for security in economic stability as well as from both 
internal and external violence. The commonly held view in economics and development was that 
development was a precondition for security and increased development would reduce the inci-
dence of conflict within and between states (Krause & Jutersonke, 2005). This was severely chal-
lenged, however, with the development that took place directly before the Rwandan genocide. In 
a crisis of scarcity, development assistance and relief are precious commodities which, if wrongly 
distributed, can reinforce social cleavages and consequently establish insecurity, instilling fear and 
provoking the environment of hostility, which results in conflict rather than alleviating it (Krause 
& Jutersonke, 2005). Thus, the security-development link has been reversed, and basic security is 
a precondition for political, social, and economic development or well-being. Major aid donors 
and international financial institutions demonstrate the history of this shift in the focus on 
“security sector reform.” These kinds of efforts represent the change in thinking for post-conflict 
development institutions in program development for security and development efforts (Krause 
& Jutersonke, 2005).   
The UK has set up a Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit for the purpose of growing 
awareness to close the planning gap between security and development efforts. The World Bank 
also included a security dimension, taking the lead on demobilization and reintegration programs 
(Krause & Jutersonke, 2005).  
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The connection between peace building and the provision for individual security is vital. 
It encompasses more than fostering stability to prevent conflict, but building political, social, and 
economic institutions for the purposes of capacity building, good governance, inclusion, econom-
ic opportunity, and individual well-being. Therefore, in order to incorporate the comprehensive 
understanding of peace, the development component needs to be included in peace-building pro-
grams (Krause & Jutersonke, 2005). The new, broader concept of security was first introduced in 
the UNDP Human Development Report to include seven different dimensions, which consisted of 
economic, food, health, environmental, personal community and political security. The overall 
goal for this report was to expand the general understanding of security, which was before de-
fined primarily in terms of territory and external threats (Krause & Jutersonke, 2005). 
An example of a broader view of security beyond that of physical security, which typically 
leads to violence, is food security. Brinkman and Hendrix concluded:  
Food insecurity is both a cause and a consequence of violence, contributing to a vicious 
cycle or “conflict trap”. Food security is critical for political stability. Food insecurity is 
linked to increased risk of democratic failure, protests and rioting, communal violence 
and civil conflict. Violent conflicts, in turn, create food insecurity, malnutrition and – in 
some instances – famine. Thus food insecurity can perpetuate conflict, although its ef-
fects depend on the context, with the strongest links evident in states that already have 
fragile markets and weak political institutions (Brinkman & Hendrix, 2011, p. 20). 
Food is a basic need for all of mankind. It is obvious that a lack of access to food can have ad-
verse effects on society, especially when there are deeper social reasons for the absence of food 
security.   
The second theoretical approach to understanding conflict is the horizontal inequalities 
theory, which seeks to understand conflict and the mobilization of groups toward violence. These 
both demonstrate a powerful link between different types of horizontal inequities and conflict. 
Frances Stewart of the University of Oxford explored the importance of horizontal inequalities 
(HIs) and their relationship to conflict. Stewart concluded that there is a proven status quo that 
cultural, ethnic, religious, or racial differences alone cannot account for conflict in an unavoidable 
“clash of civilizations,” and that they can, in fact, peacefully coexist. According to Stewart, the 
findings of Fearon and Laitin (1996) have estimated that from 1960 to 1979, of all the potential 
ethnic conflicts in Africa (defined as occurring where different ethnic groups live side by side) 
only 0.01% actually turned into violent conflict.  The question Stewart’s (2008) research raises is, 
what may be identifiable ways in which preventing conflict and the costs in terms of deaths, inju-
ries, and economic social collapse from happening?  
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If horizontal inequalities are inequalities which cause conflict, then policies should be engineered 
to reduce HIs and therefore reduce the likelihood of conflict. 
Horizontal inequalities are “inequalities in economic, social, or political dimensions of 
cultural status between culturally defined groups” (Stewart, 2008). Violent conflict within poor 
countries is typically found in seven out of ten of the poorest nations in the world. These coun-
tries are undergoing or have recently experienced some sort of civil war (Stewart, 2008). In re-
turn, violence becomes a major obstacle to development, reducing incomes and investment and 
undermining human development. Regression analysis suggests an average loss in gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita of between 2.0% and 2.4% per annum among countries experiencing 
conflict. The cost of war is staggering. There was a suggested cumulative loss of half of the GDP 
in Iraq in the case of the war between Iraq and Iran, and infant deaths during the Uganda con-
flicts amounted to 2% of the population (Stewart, 2008). 
Mobilization for violence requires motivation. Organized group conflict may be a result 
of a variety of motivations. Individual mobilization motivation is commonly believed to primarily 
be the desire to gain economic advantage. However, there is neither exclusively nor primarily a 
matter of individual motivations included in group mobilization. What are most involved in 
group’s mobilization are shared identities linked to goals to attack others in the name of the 
group. Young men may fight because they are unemployed, uneducated, or have few opportuni-
ties. Generally they fight out of loyalty to a group as opposed to personal convictions (Stewart, 
2008). Bearing this in mind, it is apparent that HIs play an important role in mobilization of 
groups.  
Vertical inequalities (VIs) are inequalities among individuals in social classes whereas HIs 
are inequalities specific to groups of culturally defined individuals on the basis of religion, ethnici-
ty, or salient factors, which bind groups of people together (i.e. political, socioeconomic, or social 
cleavages) (Stewart, 2008).   In order for mobilization to occur, grievances at both the leadership 
and the mass level may be present. In many cases, political ambition may cause a multi-
dimensional horizontal inequality due to a lack of representation of a given group’s leadership 
because of their economic and social position in relation to other groups. Major grievances, 
whether political or social, may likely be causes of mobilization. This is due to them limiting ac-
cess to education and employment, which are two primary means to elevate from poverty, and 
makes it an economic issue (Stewart, 2008). Stewart concludes: 
  Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science Vol. 1  Issue 1  July 2015 
11 
There are causal connections between different HIs. For example, inequalities in political 
power often lead to similar social and economic inequalities. A biased distribution of gov-
ernment jobs and provisions of infrastructure is common, with the group in power dis-
criminating in its favour. For example, in Burundi in the 1990’s, half of government in-
vestment went to the Bujumbura region and its vicinity, which is the home of the elite 
Tutsi group (Gaffney, 2000). In some countries, the president and his coterie have taken a 
massive share of state resources for their private use, such as the Duvaliers in Haiti and 
the Somoza family in Nicaragua (Lundahl, 2000; Pastor and Boyce, 2000). Moreover, 
there are connections between economic and social elements. Lack of access to education 
leads to poor economic opportunities, while low incomes tend to result in poor educa-
tional access and achievements in a vicious cycle of deprivation. There are also reinforc-
ing cycles of privilege and deprivation because of the way that one type of capital requires 
others to be productive (Stewart, 2008, p.13). 
Therefore, economic status and garnering a political power base between social groups can be a 
motivator for mobilization.    
Horizontal inequalities may be created due to high levels of natural resources and power 
struggles over who gains from these resources. However, conflict may be less likely to break out 
if HIs exist and there is a growing economy or where a very strong state represses any conflict. 
Another reason could be political accommodation. Socioeconomic HIs generate a hostile envi-
ronment for conflict to emerge as cultural status inequalities act to bind groups together for mo-
bilization. Political HIs provide incentives for leaders to mobilize people for rebellion. Where 
severe HIs exist and abrupt changes in political or cultural events where cultural or religious val-
ues are threatened, there exists the possibility of a powerful trigger to conflict (Stewart, 2008). 
Finally, Stewart argues that out of four hypotheses, three were confirmed significant and 
the last deemed untestable. The hypotheses include: conflict is more likely where there are signifi-
cant political and/or economic HIs, political mobilization is especially likely where HIs are con-
sistent, and cultural recognition or status inequalities are also provocative. The last, undetermined 
hypothesis is that political mobilization, and possibly conflict, is more likely to occur when HIs 
are widening. Due to lack of data over a period of time, this was determined untestable (Stewart, 
2008).  
The final theory assessed is the structural demographic theory. It postulates that labor 
oversupply leads to falling living standards and elite overproduction. Those, in turn, cause a wave 
of prolonged and intense sociopolitical instability.  
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Three empirically supported generalizations may impact outbursts of these violent cycles fol-
lowed by periods of internal peace (Turchin, 2012). The generalizations include: the neo-
Malthusian principle, the principle of elite overproduction, and the structural demographic causes 
of political instability. The neo-Malthusian principle states that sustained population growth inev-
itably leads to falling living standards and is positively impacted by the switch from an agrarian to 
an industrial economy. Simplified in terms of supply and demand, it means the supply of labor 
exceeds its demand, and the price of labor then decreases causing living standards to decrease. 
Agrarian demand for labor is limited to resources for production (cultivatable land, ability to get 
supplies/livestock). Uncontrollable population growth inevitably leads to falling living standards. 
Modern economies have more dynamic demand for labor (Turchin, 2012). Elite overproduction 
refers to a situation when upward mobility overmatches downward mobility, and the process of 
declining living standards for lower class is mismatched with increasing consumption levels of 
elites. This creates a situation where there is an increase in inequality (Turchin, 2012). Inequality 
leads to a structural demographic issue where elites obtain the higher paying employment oppor-
tunities and the lower class is unable to obtain any employment thus creating a recipe for griev-
ances and political instability. 
 These theoretical concepts increase understanding of civil wars among impoverished 
countries. Civil war in a low-income country typically lasts for nearly a decade with overwhelming 
non-combatant casualties. Reasons for death include disease, forced migration, and the break-
down of health systems (Collier, Development and Conflict, 2004). War creates a gaping hole in 
the economy that takes many years to recover. Many of the costs of the war become apparent 
after it is over. Damage is rarely contained and spreads to neighboring countries and regions with 
more than half of the total economic cost falling on the shoulders neighboring countries (Collier, 
Development and Conflict, 2004). Other costs of civil war are significant as well. 95% of the 
world’s hard drug production takes place in civil war environments where territory is outside the 
control of recognized governments (Collier, Development and Conflict, 2004).  
 Paul Collier’s research of civil wars in the world that broke out from the period of 1965-
99 indicated factors that statistically make a country prone to conflict are low income, rate of 
growth, and economic structure. A civil war is classified as an internal conflict with at least one 
thousand battle-related deaths. During this period, there were 73 civil wars globally, and in princi-
ple, Collier analyzed the pattern to determine why these wars occurred (Collier, Economic Causes 
of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy, 2006).  
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Collier divided the period up into eight, five-year sub-periods and attempted to predict the occur-
rence of war during a sub-period by the characteristics at its start. Utilizing statistical logit and 
probit regressions, he drew conclusions about patterns of the factors involved in civil war. Due 
to a lack of data on some countries, knowing that a war took place, but not knowing enough of 
its other characteristics to include it in analysis, Collier reduced the sample to 47 civil wars. How-
ever, this was still sufficient to find some strong patterns (Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Con-
flict and their Implications for Policy, 2006).  
Low-income countries face a 14% risk of civil war, but doubling the income of a country 
will halve the risk of conflict. One percentage point of growth rate reduces the risk by around a 
percentage point, and reducing dependence upon natural resource exports powerfully reduces the 
risk of conflict (Collier, Development and Conflict, 2004). Causes that lead to increased risk of 
conflict and poor economic conditions are many. One such factor is poverty making it difficult 
for governments to gain popular allegiance. Rebellion becomes an attractive option with the pro-
spect of the parties involved gaining power, weapons, and drugs (Collier, Development and Con-
flict, 2004). Generally, half of all civil wars are due to post-conflict relapse and results in common 
underlying characteristics such as low income, natural resource dependence, and the legacy of the 
conflict itself (Collier, Development and Conflict, 2004). 
 Collier’s analysis indicated that a major component of risk was whether or not the coun-
try had a substantial share of its income in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) generated from pri-
mary commodities. Dependence of 26% of GDP or more indicated serious danger of conflict. 
The risk in Collier’s sample was 23%, whereas countries with no primary commodity in exports, 
but were otherwise the same, would have a risk of half of a percentage point (Collier, Economic 
Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy, 2006).  This, as well as economic op-
portunity, provide major implications for conflict. Conflict was found to be concentrated in 
countries with low education (Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications 
for Policy, 2006). On average, young males in secondary education in the sample consisted of 
45%. Any country that had 55% of its youth in an education system would cut its risk from the 
14% risk of civil war to 10%. Again, conflict was more likely in countries with rapid population 
growth. Each percentage point of growth raises the risk of conflict by around 2.5 points. There-
fore, the most significant predictors of civil war were dependence on primary commodity ex-
ports, low average incomes, slow growth, and large diasporas (Collier, Economic Causes of Civil 
Conflict and their Implications for Policy, 2006). 
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In periods of economic stagnation, countries where there are large numbers of disaffect-
ed youth, particularly males, may become more likely to be mobilized by rebel groups. Cincotta, 
Engelman, and Anastasion (2003) studied demographic structures and incidence of war in the 
1990s and found that the outbreak of civil conflict was more than twice as likely in countries 
which the youth between the ages of 15-25 comprised more than 40% of the adult population 
compared to countries with lower proportions. Conditions in which young men feel frustrated 
with poor life prospects for income and employment may increase the likelihood that they be-
come recruited for violent conflict (Fukuda-Parr, 2007). 
 Regarding post-civil war reconstruction, a field experiment was conducted in northern 
Liberia where randomly assigned villages received international development assistance. Evidence 
demonstrates that new local-level institutions can alter patterns of social cooperation in a way 
that persists after the program concludes. Villages that were exposed to a community-driven re-
construction program exhibited higher subsequent levels of social cooperation than those in the 
control group (Fearon, Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2009). This suggests that the changes in com-
munity cohesion can take place over a short period of time and occur in response to outside in-
tervention within the context of the given and unchanged macro-level political economic situa-
tion. Therefore, it is possible for post-conflict reconstruction efforts to have measurable impact 
on social cohesion (Fearon, Humphreys, & Weinstein, 2009). 
 Post- civil war prescriptions can be effective if a holistic development approach is uti-
lized. Three instruments to reduce post conflict relapse are political design and reform, economic 
recovery, and military provisions. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that the security benefits alone 
are around four times the cost of the aid and still substantially exceed the costs even at the ad-
verse bounds of the confidence intervals of their estimates (Collier, Development and Conflict, 
2004). 
Given the evidence supporting the connection between civil war and economic standing, 
it is necessary to focus on other specific forms of conflict in terms of analysis on potential eco-
nomic causal relationships. Much research conducted on the relationship of terrorism and pov-
erty would cast doubt that there is a strong correlation between terrorist operatives and their eco-
nomic well-being. Generally, evidence supports that those recruited by terrorist organizations are 
highly educated, potentially in a higher income bracket, and have many reasons for getting in-
volved. This does not, however, explain the phenomenon of why the origins international terror-
ist attacks are traced to impoverished countries.  
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Terrorism is defined as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence 
an audience,” (Berrebi, 2007, p. 5). Its objective is maximizing media exposure to the act and, ul-
timately, to the terror group and/or to its “cause.” Many academics and policy makers have 
maintained that terrorist activity is the result of ignorance or poverty. Research conducted on ter-
rorism in Palestine indicated that 31% of Palestinians were considered poor whereas only 16% of 
those involved in terrorist activities were considered poor (Berrebi, 2007).  
Out of 208 observations where information about terrorist operatives’ education was 
available, 96% have at least a high school education and 65% (135 observations) have some kind 
of higher education, compared to 51% and 15% respectively in the overall Palestinian population 
of same age, sex, and religion. Contrasted with the general population, operatives tend to be 
younger, which further accentuates the findings of differences in poverty and education (Berrebi, 
2007). All estimates were statistically significant and indicated an inverse relation between poverty 
and education positively related between the likelihood someone was a Hamas or PIJ (Palestinian 
Islamic Jihad) operative (Berrebi, 2007). A possible explanation for this is that terrorist organiza-
tions prefer more educated individuals, but those individuals are more likely to participate in ter-
rorist activity when the economic environment is not in favor of their opportunities (Berrebi, 
2007). Interestingly, out of the information provided on education, which was little, over half in-
dicated religious studies. The most likely explanation of the results pertaining to education may 
be related to the educational content (Berrebi, 2007). 
 Demonstrably, terrorist operatives’ likelihood of being recruited for terrorist ac-
tivities is not linked to poverty statistically. However, there does prove to be a correlation be-
tween instability and the likelihood of international terrorist events originating from those coun-
tries or regions which are unstable. If in fact civil war is correlated with poverty, and contributes 
to overall instability where international terrorist attacks are likely to originate, then poverty in 
that context may contribute to international terrorism. The rationale of the “escalation effect,” 
which stresses that domestic political instability is the main reason for international terrorism, has 
demonstrated to be plausible. The econometric evidence (total number of terror acts, total fatali-
ties, and median fatalities) from a panel of more than 130 countries from 1968 to 2003 demon-
strates that civil wars and guerrilla warfare are robustly associated with various aspects of interna-
tional terrorism (Campos & Gassebner, 2009). Thus, terrorists appear to exploit existing arenas 
of conflict.  
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The results supporting the escalation effect indicates that civil wars and guerilla warfare, as well as 
riots, all exhibit the expected positive relationship and are all highly statistically significant. Tran-
sitioning from no civil war to an eruption of civil war would result in an increase in terror attacks 
by approximately 30%. The magnitude of the effect of guerilla attacks is almost identical. Keep-
ing all other factors equal, increasing the number of guerilla incidences by one results in roughly 
30% more international terror events originating from that location (Campos & Gassebner, 
2009). These results have proven to hold true in light of the attacks on 9/11, 2001, as well as the 
foiled “underwear bomber” on Christmas Day, 2009, attempted to board a flight in Detroit. Both 
cases originated from unstable countries with histories of civil war: Afghanistan, and Yemen, re-
spectively. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab (the underwear bomber) was believed to have been 
moved to Yemen by Al-Qaeda for training prior to the attempt (Temple-Raston, 2010). 
 General consensus among scholars is that fragile states are commonly impoverished, ren-
dering the less capable to deal with and manage negative dynamics like civil war and drug, weap-
ons, or human trafficking. Weak states are less able to protect themselves against insurgency or 
terrorist networks, deploy peaceful political means to resolve conflict and prevent the onset of it, 
or resolve local disputes when they arise (Fukuda-Parr, 2007). Hence, such insurgent networks 
are able to exist and use weak or unstable states as a platform to conduct international terrorism. 
Jordan Case Study 
 Utilizing theoretical concepts, examples supported with empirical evidence, and the ef-
fects of socioeconomic issues on different types of conflict (civil war and terrorism), analysis of 
real-world situations becomes possible. A case study of the revolutions in the Middle East that 
took place in 2011, popularly known as the “Arab Spring”, can demonstrate these concepts in 
detail. The analysis will turn to a case study of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It should be 
noted initially that Jordan was a fairly stable country in the midst of the Arab Spring. However, 
there may be evidence that Jordan is at risk for violence due to its socioeconomic, political, and 
cultural composition and have Arab Spring-like consequences.   
As a nation state, Jordan is burdened by scarce natural resources and uncertain de-
mographics. In 1921, British colonial powers haphazardly drew border lines on the map as with 
all the other nation states of prior colonial powers to create a monarchy of the Hashemites, a clan 
from the Hejaz region of the Arabian Peninsula. The monarchy currently takes the form of a par-
liamentary monarchy. The country has a large, arid landmass with virtually no major natural re-
sources (including oil) and limited water (Yom, 2013).  
  Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science Vol. 1  Issue 1  July 2015 
17 
The economy is therefore heavily reliant on foreign aid. The social makeup of the country is sen-
sitive and fractured among different divisions including those loyal to the king whom are “east 
bankers” or local tribal natives and the urban Palestinian majority that has been largely excluded 
from power (Yom, 2013). 
The monarchy and policy makers assume that the record of stability suggests it will re-
main stable, which has resulted in relatively little political reform despite facing unprecedented 
opposition due to political discontent and economic difficulties. This has become a shaky as-
sumption (Yom, 2013). Jordan’s polity has never been more willing to express hostility toward 
the monarch. Opposition has united in some ways across deep social cleavages: Islamist and sec-
ular, Palestinian and East Banker, urban and tribal, old dissidents and former regime officials, 
military veterans and regular civilians. The unthinkable crime of speaking out against the king is 
now a reality (Yom, 2013). The kingdom has suppressed protests and petitions for democracy for 
over two decades. The response from the regime has been spurts of controlled liberalization. Op-
position has not yielded to this appeasement the same as it has in the past, and due to rising un-
employment and living costs associated with the weak economy, which required a $2 billion 
bailout from the IMF, there may be continued frustration (Yom, 2013).  
 Jordan’s Islamist sector consists mainly of Muslim Brotherhood members and 
their party, the Islamic Action Front. The Brotherhood has a long history of political involve-
ment and is moderate. The leadership is aiming for a negotiated transition to constitutional mon-
archism and not an Islamic state (Yom, 2013). The Islamists managed to organize weekly protests 
in Amman in 2011 and 2012 drawing thousands indicating their discontent. However, these were 
virtually all peaceful. It becomes clear, then, why the regime would hesitate to give in to real dem-
ocratic reform for fear of empowering Islamists (Yom, 2013).   
 Another major part of the Jordanian social fabric is the conflict between the 
country’s ethnic- Palestinian majority and tribal East Bankers. Identity became part of the struc-
ture when the Jordanian government drove the Palestine Liberation Organization out of Jordan 
into Lebanon in 1970. The Palestinian Jordanians dominate the private sector, but due to preju-
dice, they are barred from access to political power (Yom, 2013). Tribal Jordanians fill the public 
sector, including the military and security forces, and have far closer relations with the monarchy 
and institutions itself. The officials of the state treat this as though the imbalance is permanent 
and that democratization would result in a worst-case scenario in which Palestinians could use 
their numbers to gain control of the state (Yom, 2013).  
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Economic growth has not translated into job production. Leading industries, such as real 
estate, banking, and retailing, attracted foreign capital as the labor force grew, but generated few 
jobs, especially in the tribal dominated rural areas. Privatization of state assets, including phos-
phate and potash factories, caused losses in jobs in tribal towns like Tafileh, which already suf-
fered from poor infrastructure and services. This became clear in 2011 when King Abdullah visit-
ed Tafileh. A riotous crowd throwing bottles and stones greeted him. The southern city is made 
up of mostly ethnic Jordanians and is known for intense loyalty to the ruling regime. However, 
sources tied to international media, internet, and radio depicted riots. Tension between the gov-
ernment and the loyalists demonstrates something deeper going on politically below the surface 
(Tobin, 2012). The official unemployment rate is 12.5%. However, actual joblessness is at least 
double that. In November of 2012, riots were sparked by the mandated cut by the International 
Monetary Fund to fuel subsidies, which drove up energy costs. These were mostly violent in the 
tribal areas, signaling a danger that may be involved with not taking the disparity of economic 
modernization seriously (Yom, 2013).  The poor, rural areas, consisting of tribal youths, created 
their own popular opposition through the hirak movement, a grassroots phenomenon that 
spawned hundreds of organized rallies. This is something very similar to the rest of the Arab 
spring countries (Yom, 2013).  
 Jordan’s circumstances seem to indicate that it is in a risky position and, given the 
right economic decline, could spark into more violence. The indicators that lead to this conclu-
sion are the youth bulge, the high unemployment among rural tribal youth, the Palestinian power 
struggle, and the Islamist movement. The effect of the rural tribal youth bulge is clear in light of 
activity in the rural city of Ma’an. Ma’an’s population is approximately fifty thousand. It consists 
primarily of Native-Jordanian tribes and is mostly non-Palestinian. As a result of these de-
mographics, Ma’an and other southern cities provide an important base of support for the royal 
family. Since Palestinians are barred from the public sector, Ma’an is home to numerous military 
and security personnel and remains a recruitment site for such public positions. Regardless, 
Ma’an has been the center of significant unrest sparked by the regime’s program of “economic 
reform” recommended by the International Monetary Fund (Schwedler, 2002). 
In 1990, 43.4% of the working age group was youth aged 15 to 24. This has since de-
creased to 36.8%. Based on the statistics quoted before by Kukuda-Parr (2007), anything above 
40% creates a situation where conflict is more than twice as likely. Coupled with the high unem-
ployment, this produces an unfavorable situation under political oppression (United Nations, 
2010).  
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The horizontal inequalities of political power among the Palestinians and the impoverished rural 
tribal areas could potentially create power struggles among social cleavages and amplify already 
existing stratification between the government and society. Should there ever be any sort of pop-
ular revolution, these parties would then compete against each other for power during the for-
mation of the new government.  
 With the rural tribal areas being one of the most at risk aspects of Jordanian de-
mographics, it becomes important to solidly grasp the economic makeup regarding rural income 
and inequality. A study conducted by Richard Adams of the World Bank in 2001, found that 
50.6% of total rural household income in Jordan is non-farm income. The GINI coefficient was 
0.408 within rural income. This demonstrates that within rural income there is a fairly high level 
of inequality. The rural poor receive less than 20% of their total per capita income from non-
farm income. People in rural Jordan do not press for land access since the really attractive eco-
nomic rates of return are found not in agriculture, but rather in the nonfarm sector. Only 30% of 
the cultivated land base is irrigated, and the main field crops (wheat and barley) are generally 
grown under rain-fed conditions so the yields are low (Adams, 2001). 
 The rich in rural Jordan earn less than 10% of their total per capita income from agricul-
ture and over 55% of their total income is from non-farm sources.  In percentage terms non-
farm income accounts for 53% of inequality in rural Jordan. Therefore, non-farm income makes 
the single largest contribution to rural income inequality (Adams, 2001). The correlation of non-
farm income with total income is highly related in Jordan. This suggests that, in Jordan, non-farm 
income is closely synonymous with total rural income. Therefore, non-farm income is not only 
the single most important source of income, but it is also very similar to non-farm income as a 
whole benefiting primarily the top quintile. (Adams, 2001). Non-farm income in Jordan is broken 
down into five categories: government employment, private sector, unskilled labor, and other, 
which refers to things such as building sales (Adams, 2001). 
 In Jordan, 60% of poor rural income is from the government. Those in the top quintile 
receive over 68% of their non-farm income from government employment (Adams, 2001). This 
is especially important regarding rural income because those in the bottom may not have access 
to government employment through social capital, or “wasta” which is the access to a middleman 
to gain access to social needs. This would explain the high inequality among rural Jordanians, the 
link between nonfarm income and rural inequality, and the even bigger divide between rural poor 
and urban rich. 
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 Though government employment can significantly decrease unemployment in rural Jor-
dan, it would be a mistake to envision a policy around increasing government employment. There 
are not enough employment needs to suit the whole community, and the added stress on the 
economy to pay these workers would be a drain on the economy. Therefore, it becomes im-
portant to focus on the unskilled nonfarm workers, such as construction workers, brick makers, 
and ditch diggers (Adams, 2001). Policy implications will be further explored in the conclusion 
section.  
Jordan Case Study: Supporting Data Analysis  
Considering the social make up of Jordan, empirical analysis demonstrates some verifica-
tion about the economic effects on political stability of the nation. The following statistical analy-
sis (conducted by the author), based on two data sets from the World Bank “World Develop-
ment Indicators” database (WDI) and The World Handbook of Politics IV (WHIV), will be discussed 
in addition to the case study on Jordan’s economic and social fabric adding to the arguments 
about instability.  
Data for Jordan is limited regarding group inequalities, and there are not records of indi-
vidual income levels or education levels that can be used to compare different groups of people 
(ie. Palestinian-Jordanian or Native-Jordanian). However, there are some indicators that can be 
correlated with each other that allude to the presence of horizontal inequalities (HIs) in Jordan. 
The indicators used in this research were taken from the years of 1990 to 2004 and include meas-
urements for both political instability as well as economic and social measurements. Furthermore, 
a two-tailed linear regression analysis using these indicators develops a strong case for causality 
regarding the presence of HIs and their effects on political instability in Jordan. The resulting 
concept of the social make up in Jordan regarding HIs is between Palestinian-Jordanians living in 
urban centers and rural Native-Jordanians with lack of access to employment opportunities. It is 
unclear, however, if Palestinian refugees have inequalities when compared to either of the two 
groups. 
Data: 
 The data was coded in order to fit the needs of this model as follows. The WHIV dataset 
(Jenkins, Taylor, Abbott, Maher, & Peterson, 2012) contains variables representing protest inci-
dents for each year for three different actors categorized as “civil”, “state”, and “unknown”. Each 
variable consisted of three observations for each year based on each actor, meaning that for the 
year 1990, there was an observation for civil actor protests, state actor protests, and unknown 
actor protests.  
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 Variables then were coded and broken down into three different variables, one for each actor, in 
order to have one data point for each year to coincide with the WDI dataset. The protest data 
consisted of variables, “PDEM” (protest demonstration-All protest demonstrations not other-
wise specified), “POBS” (protest obstruction-Sit-ins and other non-military occupation protests), 
“PMAR” (protest procession-Picketing and other parading protests), “PPRO” (protest deface-
ment-Damage, sabotage and the use of graffiti to desecrate property and symbols), 
“PALT” (protest altruism-Protest demonstrations that place the actor (protestor) at risk for the 
sake of unity with the target), “SRAL” (rally support-Gatherings to express or demonstrate sup-
port for an existing government or institution. Includes celebrations, public displays of confi-
dence, commemorations, and vigils), and “STRI” (strikes and boycotts-Labor and professional 
sanctions reported as strikes, general strikes, walkouts, lockouts, or withholding of goods/
services). For the purposes of generating a model attempting to measure instability, variables 
“PALT” and “SRAL” were removed from the data set as they both measured pro-government 
protests as opposed to protests against the government, which would demonstrate political insta-
bility. Therefore, the protests that were utilized were, “PDEM”, “POBS”, “PMAR”, “PPRO”, 
and “STRI”. These were recoded into three variables apiece for each actor and renamed as, 
“PDEMCIVIL” (civil actor), “PDEMUNK” (unknown actor), and “PDEMSTAT” (state actor). 
Each of the rest of the original variables was also recoded into three new codes to have the actor 
identifier of “CIVIL”, “UNK”, or “STAT” (i.e. POBSCIVIL, POBSUNK, etc.). Actors that did 
not have any observations were no longer relevant and were left out of the dataset because their 
observations were zero. At that point, aggregate variables were created for civil protests and state 
actor protests, grouping all CIVIL protests into one variable and all STAT protests into another. 
These were then coded as “PCIVIL” and PSTAT” respectively. The variables of “PCIVIL” and 
“PSTAT” became the primary variables used as dependent variables in the analysis. 
 The WDI data set (World Development Indicators, 2014) consisted of economic and so-
cial data that was taken to represent the independent variables of the analysis. These variables 
included, “CPII” (Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)), “MORT” (Mortality rate, under-5 yrs. 
old per 1,000 live births), “REFPOP” (Refugee population by country or territory of asy-
lum),”URBPOP” (Urban population growth (annual %)), and “RURPOP” (Rural population (% 
of total population)). 
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 Method and Results: 
 The variables were first arrayed in a correlation coefficient matrix to determine correla-
tions, the slope of the correlation, and level of statistical significance for each correlation by uti-
lizing a Pearson correlation two-tailed test. These are displayed in the following Table 1.  
Table 1 
*   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




There are some interesting correlations that were used to determine which linear tests 
would be best to perform. The full analysis will be discussed further after the linear models are 
displayed in the analysis. There were several relationships that were collinear and were not used in 
the following linear tests as that would have unintended consequences on the results. These col-
linear variables were RURPOP and REFPOP, CPII and RURPOP, MORT and REFPOP, and 
MORT and RURPOP. 
  PCIVIL PSTAT REFPOP RURPOP URBPOP CPII MORT 
PCIVIL 1.0000000 0.5023149 -0.5113463 0.5464802* 0.1238167 0.7303852** 0.5346665* 
PSTAT 0.5023149 1.0000000 -0.4724389 0.5306817* 0.3677070 0.7856795** 0.4891948 
REFPOP -0.5113463 -0.4724389 1.0000000 -0.9602680** -0.7628084** -0.6929683** -0.9975739** 
RURPOP 0.5464802* 0.5306817* -0.9602680** 1.0000000 0.7861188** 0.7844944** 0.9532731** 
URBPOP 0.1238167 0.3677070 -0.7628084** 0.7861188** 1.0000000 0.4565361 0.7466442** 
CPII 0.7303852** 0.7856795** -0.6929683** 0.7844944** 0.4565361 1.0000000 0.6877527** 
MORT 0.5346665* 0.4891948 -0.9975739** 0.9532731** 0.7466442** 0.6877527** 1.0000000 
  Journal of Interdisciplinary Conflict Science Vol. 1  Issue 1  July 2015 
23 
Based on these correlations and collinear relationships the following eleven regression 
models were tested and displayed in Table 2.  
Table 2 
*    Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 











Multiple                
R-Squared 
P-Value 
1 PCIVIL RURPOP 0.7309 3.166 0.2986 0.035* 
2 PCIVIL URBPOP 0.1659 3.751 0.01533 0.6602 
3 PCIVIL URBPOP 
-1.0725 2.658 0.5434 0.02612* 
    RURPOP 
1.5725 2.658 0.5434 0.00290** 
4 PCIVIL URBPOP -0.8 2.968 0.431 0.08302 
    REFPOP 
-0.01301 2.968 0.431 0.01190* 
5 PCIVIL URBPOP 
-0.8339 2.898 0.4572 0.07538 
    MORT 
0.99549 2.898 0.4572 0.00876** 
6 PCIVIL CPII 
0.6039 2.445 0.6458 0.0254* 
    URBPOP -0.7029 2.445 0.6458 0.0886 
    REFPOP 
-0.006008 2.445 0.6458 0.2108 
7 PCIVIL CPII 
0.5844 2.384 0.6633 0.0249* 
    URBPOP 
-0.7253 2.384 0.6633 0.0657 
    MORT 
0.4833 2.384 0.6633 0.1475 
8 PSTAT CPII 
0.2919 0.8567 0.6396 0.00444** 
    URBPOP 0.0808 0.8567 0.6396 0.55246 
    REFPOP 
0.001303 0.8567 0.6396 0.42814 
9 PSTAT CPII 
0.27881 0.8701 0.6282 0.00601** 
    MORT 
-0.06407 0.8701 0.6282 0.58274 
    URBPOP 
0.0544 0.8701 0.6282 0.68251 
10 PCIVIL CPII 
0.6778 2.582 0.5335 0.00199** 
11 PSTAT CPII 
0.2532 0.8121 0.6173 0.000517*** 
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 These models demonstrate some intriguing relationships given the evidence from the Jordan 
case study above. In the correlation matrix it is important to note that rural population, as a per-
centage of the overall population (RURPOP), was positive and statistically significant with both 
civil (PCIVIL) and state (PSTAT) protests. This demonstrates that rural population growth is 
correlated with those protests. Likewise, the consumer price index (CPII) was highly significant 
statistically at the 0.01 level for both civil and state protests. Also it is important to observe that 
the mortality rate (MORT) was positive and statistically significant for civil protests whereas ur-
ban population was positive and not statistically significant for either protest.  
These serve as the three main hypotheses for the regression models. If rural population as 
a percentage of total population, the consumer price index, and the child mortality rate 
(specifically, those under five years old per one thousand live births) are statistically significant 
and positive while controlling for other possible confounding variables, then there may be strong 
evidence to support that HIs do, in fact, exist and have an effect on political instability. The logic 
behind this is the consumer price index will mostly affect the disadvantaged, and the disadvan-
taged are primarily the rural, poor tribal Jordanians. Also, it is a fair assumption that the mortality 
rate is highly statistically significant with rural population and less so for urban population, and 
those in the rural areas are more at risk for higher mortality rates. Furthermore, if all three of 
these are statistically significant with civil protests and positively sloped while controlling for ur-
ban population growth and refugee population growth, the argument can be made that evidences 
suggests causality between the relationship of the existence of HIs and political instability.  
 The regression analysis makes a case for causality between HIs in Jordan and political in-
stability. Some models to point out include models 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. The consumer price index 
was used in more of the models over rural population as a percent of population due to its higher 
level of statistical significance and its positive and statistically significant correlation with rural 
population as opposed to its less positive slope and non-statistical significance with urban popu-
lation. Due to the co-linearity of the CPII variable with RURPOP, only one of these could be 
used per model. 
 Some very interesting conclusions can be drawn regarding HIs in Jordan. Model 3 sug-
gests that PCVIL and RURPOP have a positive correlation, and rural population is statistically 
significant while urban population had a negative correlation and was less statistically significant.  
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  This indicates that, based on the slope, for every 1.57 percentage point of increase in rural pop-
ulation there was a 1 point increase in civil protests with an error rate of + or – 2.65%. In con-
trast for every 1 point of increase in urban population growth, there was a negative slope of a 
1.07 decrease in civil protests. Similarly, Model 5 demonstrates that the mortality rate of children 
under 5 years old per thousand births is positively sloped at 0.99, almost one point increase per 
point of civil protest increase and is statistically significant while urban population has a negative 
slope and is not statistically significant. This is important because the mortality rate on the corre-
lation matrix is highly statistically significant with both RURPOP and URBPOP variables. It has a 
95.3% correlation with rural population, but only a 74.6% correlation with urban population, 
thus demonstrating that the mortality rate is higher among the rural population.  
The last four models, Models 6-9, focus on the CPII as the primary variable of interest. 
This is because RURPOP is collinear with CPII, and the inflation as an annual percent on the 
consumer price demonstrates that the economy plays an important role on protests. The inflation 
has a greater effect on the poor rural areas than the urban areas and is more statistically signifi-
cant than the mortality rate. As shown in Model 6, for example, the CPII variable slope is posi-
tively correlated with civil protests and statistically significant where both URBPOP (urban popu-
lation) and REFPOP (refuge population) were negative and not statistically significant. Likewise 
Model 7 indicates that MORT does not have as much of an impact on civil protests, despite its 
positive slope. It is not statistically significant when compared with both CPII and URBPOP. 
This means that for every 0.6% increase in annual consumer price index, civil protests also in-
creased by one point. This is especially important when both models maintained a high Multiple 
R-Squared of 64.5 and 66.3%, demonstrating the degree to which the dependent variable was im-
pacted by the independent variables.  
 Lastly, Models 8 and 9 demonstrate similar results when compared to the consumer price 
index with state protests. When CPII is tested with URBPOP and REFPOP it maintained a posi-
tive slope with a high level of statistical significance. Likewise, once REFPOP was removed and 
MORT added, it remained positive in slope and statistically significant, while MORT, surprisingly 
had a negative slope and is not statistically significant. 
 It is clear that the inflation rate measured by consumer price index, the mortality rate of 
age under five per one thousand births, and rural population as a percent of overall population 
each has a distinct affect on political stability in Jordan. The implications are that HIs are in-
volved in the causal effect of the instability and policy can be pinpointed to the most at-risk as-
pects of the economy.  
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Policy Implications and Conclusion:  
 Given this information, it seems that substantial evidence across a variety of different 
types of conflict issues, provided with examples, indicate that socioeconomic stability can con-
tribute to the escalation or incitement of violence. The basic need for human security, horizontal 
inequality theory, and structural demographic theory provide a respectable reference point and 
structure by which violence can be analyzed and understood in terms of economic development. 
A case study of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan backed up by statistical analysis demonstrates 
how these concepts could potentially explain the risk of instability for the nation should these 
issues go unimpeded which can further result in violence. 
 Possible policy implications should include political reform targeting ethnic dominance 
of tribal Jordanians over Palestinians in regard to political power. According to Collier (2008), 
this can be done by entrenching minority rights into the constitution or government structure. 
One possible course of action would be to establish some sort of legislation on group rights 
while advocating strong individual rights. If the individuals in the society have a sense of security 
from discrimination, then the minorities will feel secure, lessening fear and irrational actions to 
gain security. This should include checks and balances, which the state utilizes in its government 
power (Collier, Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy, 2006). A 
possible course of action might include breaking up the divide of the Palestinian and non-
Palestinians in the public sector and private sector in Jordan. These government-level policies 
could be accomplished through human rights legislation and reformation of political systems to 
include a proportional representation across groups and a power sharing vote systems (Stewart, 
2008).  
These polices ensure balanced group representation in parliament, government, and in 
some cases, the executive. Lijphart (1986) has suggested that the simplest way of ensuring ethnic 
representation is to create separate electoral rolls with seats allocated by group rather than geo-
graphic boundary. This has been implemented in Cyprus and in New Zealand (Stewart, 2008). An 
alternative would be to create a single electoral roll but reserve certain seats for certain groups as 
it is in India where 15% of parliament seats are reserved for Scheduled Castes, but registered elec-
tors from all groups in the constituency vote for them. In multiethnic societies there is a strong 
tendency for political parties to become ‘ethnic’ as this seems to be the most effective way to mo-
bilize votes. Therefore, systems of “list” proportional representation, or a single transferable vote 
in multimember districts, may be a suitable system, as adopted by Malta and Ireland (Stewart, 
2008).  
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Without some constraining influences, political parties can be highly divisive in multicultural soci-
eties with elections leading to conflict. A final political policy option could be to place restrictions 
on political parties themselves, such as Ghana and Nigeria, where political parties have to have 
representatives throughout the country and, given the geographic concentration of ethnic groups, 
promotes multiethnic parties (Stewart, 2008).  
Economic reforms could possibly include quotas for employment, and special investment 
or credit programs for particular groups. It is clear that an effort from both the private sector and 
the government is necessary. However, non-government organizations and businesses may play 
an important role in transforming the economic landscape by focusing on rural tribal Jordanians 
who are disenfranchised and at-risk of popular revolt under unfavorable economic conditions. It 
is clear that the non-farm sector of the rural Jordanian economy would benefit greatly if business 
would invest in the rural sector. This would allow firms to expand their markets and increase op-
portunities for rural Jordanians. Government incentives could place pressure on the private sec-
tor in order to accomplish this. These are just a few out of many possible outcomes for nations 
with economies that favor conflict. Each nation will need to implement policies specific to their 
social and economic fabric.  
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